

DRAFT:

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REPORT OF INSPECTION

CIA INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM

I. GENERAL

- A. Authority: Executive Order 12065, Section 5-202(a) and (h)
- B. Date: August 1 and 2, 1979
- C. ISOO Representatives: Harold Mason and John Cornett, Program Analysts.
- D. Purpose: To make an initial evaluation of agency actions to implement Executive Order 12065 and ISOO Directive No. 1.
- E. Principal Contacts: See enclosure 1
- F. Method: Discussion with agency personnel and review of CIA classified holdings in accordance with procedures in enclosure 2.

II. FINDINGS

A. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES:

One of the basic measures of compliance with the Order and Directive is the degree to which an agency has fulfilled the general responsibilities, applicable to all agencies which originate or handle classified information, outlined in Section 5-4 of the Order. A summary of actions by the CIA staff in this regard follows.

- 1. (5-401/402). An unclassified agency information

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security regulation and unclassified guidelines for systematic declassification review had been developed and issued. They had not been published in the Federal Register. Although the guidelines had been approved by ISOO, the regulation had not (i.e., ISOO had recommended changes, but the changes had not been implemented).

2. (5-403). Four classified classification guides, with a total distribution of 3,431 copies, had been published. The guides were in detail and in the format prescribed by ISOO Directive No. 1, Para. II D.
3. (5-404(a) and (b)). The Deputy Director for Administration had been designated to oversee the agency program and to chair an agency committee to act on suggestions and complaints concerning the agency's information security program.
4. (5-404(c)). There was in being a process for deciding appeals from denials of mandatory declassification review requests.
5. (5-404(d)). There had been aggressive action to familiarize all agency personnel with the Order and Directive. Initial orientation, consisting of an excellent tape-slide presentation with a question/answer period, was presented

in 52 sessions prior to the effective date of the Order. In addition, information security packages have been included in various internal agency training programs.

6. (5-404(e)). See II A 1 above.
7. (5-404(f)). The CIA mission requires that all employees be subjects of a favorable full field background investigation and a polygraph examination. Although clearances are granted on a "blanket" basis, access to specific information is controlled, primarily through the Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Information Programs.
8. (5-404(g)). Safeguarding practices are systematically reviewed with a view toward simplicity and improvement. For example, a recent review of problems associated with protecting the large number of documents held by the agency resulted in a "Sensitive Document Control Program". As a result of this certain documents, selected at operating official level, are stored separately and must be personally accounted for by designated officials.

B. CLASSIFICATION

1. The total number of CIA personnel who possess original classification authority is 1629 (TS-430, S-1169 and C-21) -- a decrease of 74

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from the number reported in mid-1978. Positions to which original classification authority is delegated are designated by memorandum. Additionally, incumbents of these positions are subjects of a formal personnel action designating them as an authorized classifier. A listing of all authorized classifiers, by name, title, employee number, and classification level is published periodically. The list is classified Secret because of the association of names with employee numbers for those personnel under cover. The ISOO representatives were not authorized to review this listing as a whole, but were allowed to review specific names of those personnel not under cover. In an effort to control derivative classification, a similar system is used to designate those persons who are authorized to apply derivative markings.

2. A total of approximately 150 agency originated classified documents of all classification levels, collateral and Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Information (SCII), were reviewed in the various offices visited. In no case did a document appear to be over-classified. Classification markings were proper except that in a very few cases documents were not portion marked. In most cases

observed, documents were marked as derivatively classified with a CIA Classification Guide as the source. (Source citations were checked against guides and in all cases were found to be appropriate). Most documents were marked for declassification review at the 20 year mark; those originally classified almost exclusively used "sources and methods" as the basis for extension beyond 6 years. Only a few observed were marked for automatic declassification at the 6 year mark. Some area studies and personality studies were marked with a review date of 6 years.

C. DECLASSIFICATION

1. Systematic Review: The agency has given special attention to systematic review of records for declassification: there is operating under the Chief, Information Security Staff, a Classification Review Division with 30 full-time agency personnel, 15 part-time annuitants (total authorization is 39 full time personnel) and a budget of \$1.2 million for FY 80. Material for systematic review comes from present agency holdings of approximately 45 million pages plus an equal amount estimated to be created in the next ten years. There was no estimate regarding how much of this (90 million pages) will be designated as permanent records and

thus subject to review under E. O. 12065.

Although review of 200 cu. ft. of predecessor agency (WWII OSS) records resulted in over 90% being declassified and accessioned to NARS, review of post-WWII records has so far resulted in retention of classification in approximately 90% of the cases. (One reason for this high percentage is that CIA files are normally cut off of project, rather than a given date; accordingly some material being reviewed is relatively current). Although a low percentage of documents are declassified, a considerable number are downgraded to Confidential, thus reducing storage and handling requirements. Records of decisions to continue classification are computerized, facilitating the administrative action of certifying continued classification by the Director as well as retrieval from file. After review, documents, including those declassified, are returned to the agency records storage area.

2. Mandatory Review: All requests for release of information, whether submitted under FOIA, Privacy Act, or E. O. 12065, are handled by the Information and Privacy Division (with a staff of 23) on a "first in-first out" basis regardless

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of the time limits imposed by statute or Executive Order. The procedure established for processing a request is:

1. Determine if the request meets the requirements.
2. Notify the requester that the request has been received and is being processed.
3. Send the request to the Directorate with subject matter interest.
4. Follow-up the request, if not received from the Directorate, within an established period of time.
5. After the review has been completed, the agency sends a letter to the requester along with releaseable information. If the request is denied, the requester is advised of his rights.

It is estimated that it takes 116 staff years annually to process requests. The total backlog is considerable, e.g., the Division Chief estimated that even if no new requests were received it would take 18-24 months to process requests presently on hand. Time limits for processing requests under E. O. 12065 are not being met; in fact, letters acknowledging receipt of a requests frankly state this and advise the requester of his right to appeal on that basis. Appeals are handled administratively in the

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same manner as requests and the same problems apply. There appears to be little that can be done to speed the process, given the requirement for detailed review and coordination to protect intelligence sources and methods.

D. SAFEGUARDING. The CIA is in compliance with all ← safeguarding procedures established under the Order.

They have Top Secret control offices in all Directorates and conduct inventory of Top Secret documents on an annual basis. Top Secret, codeword and compartmented information is stored in security containers located within vaulted areas and access is restricted to personnel on a need-to-know basis. They have also adopted a sensitive document control program with strict accountability for particularly sensitive documents.

III. KUDOS

A. The agency Information Security Program Handbook

STATINTL

[REDACTED] although requiring some changes and additions in the opinion of ISOO, is an excellent publication and a credit to its authors.

B. Personnel of the agency with whom the program was discussed indicated an in-depth knowledge of both the mechanics and the philosophy of the information security program.

C. The use of Agency Classification Guides was evident in all components where files were reviewed.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Central Intelligence Agency appears dedicated in their desire to fully comply with the provisions of the Order. Officials interviewed were thoroughly knowledgeable with the Order and implementing directive, and sincere is their desire to adhere to the information security program.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon findings above, ISOO recommends that CIA:

1. Expedite publication of their agency regulations in the Federal Register.
2. Expedite publication of their systematic review guidelines in the Federal Register.
3. Provide a copy of the ISOO report to the Chief, Information Services Staff.

Enclosures:

1. Review Itinerary
2. CIA procedure for access to classified information by ISOO personnel

DRAFTER: HMason/JCornett/yh